to assist the poor in meeting the cost of health care. 8 States choosing to participate in the Medicaid program have the option of providing Medicaid benefits to the medically needy. 7 Several states with such programs, however, deny Medicaid to applicants who dispose of assets before application for benefits." In addition, some state laws have provided for termination of Medicaid benefits to recipients who transfer assets to prevent the state's recovering the cost of medical assistance from the recipient's estate after his death. 9 Although few cases have been decided in this area, the trend in the federal courts and in some state courts has been to invalidate these "transfer of assets" rules by holding that they conflict with federal law. 10 Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals halted this trend by upholding California's transfer of assets rule in Dawson v. Myers."
The courts' resolutions of the asset transfer issue have been unsatisfactory. Construing the same statutory and regulatory language, they have reached the disparate results illustrated by the cases of Ms. Fabula and Mr. Manahan. Other courts have manipulated the statutory and regulatory language to reach results that 9E.g., N.Y. Soc. Sanv. LAw §366(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1980) . The New York law would deny eligibility even if the transferred asset is one that would not affect eligibility if the applicant or recipient retained it (for example, the applicant's home) on the theory that the transfer was made to prevent the state from recovering the cost of benefits after the recipients death. See also Fabula v. Buck, in which the court invalidated a Maryland regulation making ineligible for Medicaid any applicant or recipient who transferred assets in order to circumvent the state's recovery procedures. 598 F.2d 869, 871 (4th Cir. 1979) .
Federal law places some limitations on a state's recovery from a recipients estate. States may recover only for benefits supplied to a recipient aged sixty-five or older. Moreover, states may not recover so long as the recipients spouse or disabled or minor child is still living. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (1976). 10 See, e.g., Caldwell v seemed just in the cases before them. 12 Recent federal legislation 13 is equally unsatisfactory because it fails to resolve the conflict illustrated by the cases and thus paves the way for continuing piecemeal solutions. 14 This Comment focuses on the application of state transfer of assets rules to the elderly medically indigent. 15 Part I, in presenting the origins and significance of the asset transfer problems, argues that the states need a method of protecting against abusive asset transfers because their alternative may be to restrict or eliminate essential care for the medically needy. The major asset transfer cases, which pose the basic questions in this area, are discussed in part II. After proposing in part III a reinterpretation of the federal statute and regulations at issue in these cases, part IV critically examines federal legislation recently enacted to deal with the asset transfer problem. The Comment concludes that, because the recent legislation permits states to create their own asset transfer policies, but within poorly defined limits, the issue is not yet resolved. The states must recognize the problems highlighted by the cases and establish asset transfer policies that strike a reasonable balance between the needs of Medicaid recipients and the states' concern for providing benefits to the needy.
I. THE ASSET TRANSFER ISSUE

A. Origins
States choosing to participate in the Medicaid program 1 must provide benefits to the "categorically needy," those individuals who 14 See text accompanying notes 145-77 infra. 16 Most of the cases in the area involve elderly applicants. See, e.g., Fabula v. Buck, 598 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1979); Scarpuzza v. Blum, 73 A.D.2d 237, 426 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1980) ; Lerner v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 70 Wis. 2d 670, 235 N.W.2d 478 (1975) . Elderly people also are more likely to become permanent residents of long-term care facilities, see text accompanying notes 37-39 infra, and they may wish to transfer their homes (and other assets) to relatives to avoid probate. See Brief for Appellants at [6] [7] Dawson v. Myers (profile of plaintiff Dawson who quitclaimed her interest in her home to her grandchildren because she wanted them to enjoy their "inheritance" before her death).
This Comment does not discuss Medicare, the national health insurance program for the elderly, which covers long-term care only for a limited period of time and only after hospitalization. See Note, Medicare and Medicaid: The Failure of the Present Health Care System for the Elderly, 17 A=uz. L. REv. 522, 523-26 (1975) . The elderly person who needs government assistance to meet the costs of indefinite or permanent care cannot rely on Medicare.
16 See note 6 supra & accompanying text.
[Vol. 129:882 receive cash payments from the federal or a state government to cover daily expenses because their incomes and other resources are insufficient.17 At their option, participating states also may provide Medicaid benefits to the "medically needy," 18 defined by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) l9 as "aged, blind, or disabled individuals or families and children . . . whose income and resources are above the limits prescribed for the categorically needy but are within the limits set under the medicaid State plan." 20 Under a program for the medically needy, these individuals receive financial assistance, but only for health care expenses.
2 1
To qualify as medically needy under current federal regulations, a person must be "linked" to a categorical assistance program 22 -in other words, bear all the characteristics of a recipient of cash assistance, except for his or her income and other financial 17 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1976 I1 1979) ). The change became effective May 4, 1980 . 45 Fed. Beg. 29,642 (1980 . This Comment will use the acronym "HHS" throughout, including references to actions by HEW before the name change. 20 42 C.F.R. § 435.4 (1979). 2142 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976 27 Resources could be given away or sold for less than adequate consideration 28 without precluding eligibility for SSI.29 The divergence between this federal rule and several state rules denying Medicaid benefits to medically needy persons who divested themselves of assets prior to application for benefits gave rise to litigation that has split the courts 30 and culminated in the 1980 legislative attempt to solve the problem. 31 The meager cash payments distributed under the SSI program provide little incentive to divest oneself of substantial assets merely to receive SSI benefits. 2 In contrast, because the potential 23This means that there must be a qualifying dependent child in the family. 42 C.F.R. § 435.310 (1979). See note 17 supra. 2442 C.F.R. § § 435.320-. 325 (1979) . See note 17 supra. 242 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1976) . One option in the Medicaid statute does permit states to cover fewer than all SSI recipients, provided the state does not use requirements that are more restrictive than those in effect in January 1972. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (1976) . This is the so-called "209(b)" option, added by the Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 209(b) cost of long-term institutional care is huge, the temptation to transfer assets in order to receive Medicaid benefits may be very real. The Senate report accompanying an unenacted 1979 bill observed that [w] here an individual with significant assets is faced with the prospect of substantial medical expenses-particularly in cases where a prolonged period of institutionalization may be needed-present law may provide a strong incentive for him to give those assets away to a friend or relative so as to qualify for medicaid immediately. To the extent that this happens, the costs of the program are increased since medical expenses which could be met from the individual's assets are instead being paid for by public funds. 33 The new legislation is not likely to change these incentives. Although the legislation places restrictions on asset transfers by SSI applicants and gives states some flexibility in creating their own policies affecting medically needy Medicaid applicants, it does not alter the benefits received. The dilemma remains-the creation of an asset transfer rule that both accommodates the states' concerns and protects deserving applicants.
B. Significance
The difficulties in meeting the long-term health care needs of the elderly population are for several reasons likely to intensify in the near future. 3 4 First, the elderly population is increasing. One commentator has noted that
[i]n 1977, 23.5 million people-one in every nine persons in the United States-were sixty-five years of age or older. By 2010, when the "baby boom" children are only beginning to reach age sixty-five, the number of elderly persons in this country is expected to be thirtythereafter. 20 C.F.R. § 416.410 (1980 four million. That number is expected to reach fifty-two million by 2030, at which time the proportion of our populace over sixty-five should peak at somewhere between fourteen and twenty-two percent.85
Second, the cost of health care is increasing dramatically, approaching ten percent of the gross national product. 36 Third, for at least some elderly individuals with chronic ill health, entry into a longterm care facility represents more than an arrangement for medical or nursing care-it represents an indefinite and perhaps permanent living situation. An elderly person's desire to give his house or other assets accumulated during his lifetime to his children is understandable. Using his assets to pay for health care may defeat his lifelong plans. The states' concerns, however, must also be recognized. Hospital and long-term care services currently represent two-thirds of Medicaid benefits costs. 33 The aged, blind, and disabled, who are most likely to need these services, account for approximately sixty-four percent of Medicaid expenditures. 3 9 It is neither unreasonable nor unjust to expect that an individual's assets will help defray 15,624; Ohio, id. 1[ 15,626; Utah, id. 1 15,646; Virginia, id. 1[ 15,652; and Missouri, [1979] 3 MEDICAPE AND MEDICAID GUmE (CCH) 1f 15,606.
Of the states providing medically needy coverage and ostensibly using SSI eligibility criteria, several had asset transfer rules even before federal law authorized such rules. 45 for example, was a class action attack on California's asset transfer rule. 4 0 Under that rule an applicant for Medi-Cal 47 transferring assets for inadequate consideration within two years before application is ineligible for benefits, unless he can rebut the presumption that he made the transfer to establish eligibility or to reduce his share of medical costs. 48 The district court hearing the case granted the State of California's motion for summary judgment. Ct. 353 (1980) . The regulation establishes that only objective facts may be used to rebut the presumption. Statements of subjective intent, such as intent to avoid probate or lack of knowledge concerning the availability of Medi-Cal benefits, are not relevant. Objective facts include "evidence that adequate resources were available at the time of the transfer of property for support and medical care considering such things as the applicant's or beneficiary's age, health, life expectancy, and ability to understand extent of resources." Id. § 50409(b) (2). 49 Similarly, Caldwell v. Blum 53 involved a class action challenge to New York's asset transfer rule by elderly medically needy individuals residing in that state. The New York law presumed that a transfer of any property within eighteen months prior to application for Medicaid benefits was made for the purpose of qualifying for benefits. 4 Certain items of property, such as a homestead and essential personal property, were not counted in determining an applicant's eligibility for benefits. 5 5 If an applicant transferred even that exempt property for inadequate consideration within eighteen months before application or at any time after application, however, he was presumed to have done so "for the purpose of defeating any current or future right to recovery of medical assistance paid, or for the purpose of qualifying for, continuing eligibility for or increasing need for medical assistance." 56 The applicant had the burden of proving to a social services official that the transfer was not made for the proscribed purpose.
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The district court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the New York statute and implementing regulations. 5 8 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the New York law conflicted with the federal statue and HHS regulations. 5 9 The conflict between the two circuits revolves primarily around two provisions of subchapter XIX of the Social Security 51622 F.2d at 1314. The New York regulations require only proof "to the satisfaction of the social services official," id. Cf. note 48 supra (use of objective facts required in California). Caldwell v. Blum, No. 78-CV-569 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1979) . 59 621 F.2d at 497-98. See notes 62-64 infra for the text of the applicable federal statutes and regulations.
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The United States Supreme Court has twice refused to stay the Second Circuit's order in Caidwell. In a short opinion announced prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dawson, Justice Marshall refused New York's request to stay the injunction, declaring that the state had failed to meet its twin burdens of proving both irreparable harm and the likelihood that four members of the Supreme Court would vote to grant certiorari. Blum v. Caldwell, 100 S. Ct. 1635 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, 1980 Act 6 0 and an HHS implementing regulation."' The first statutory section, or comparability provision, requires that a state electing to cover the medically needy furnish medical assistance to all individuals who, but for their incomes and other resources, would be considered categorically needy, yet who have insufficient funds to meet their medical costs. The insufficiency of incomes and resources is to be evaluated "in accordance with comparable standards." 62 The second troublesome section, or availability provision, requires that a state Medicaid plan take into account only the income and resources that are "available to the applicant." 63 The disputed HHS regulation (subsection 401(c)) requires that state plans not use eligibility requirements for the medically needy aged, blind, and disabled that are more restrictive than those used under the SSI program. 64 The Caldwell court relied on the comparability provision 05 to reach its holding that New York's imposition of "'more restrictive eligibility requirements on the medically needy than on the cate- 67Id. 498-99. 68 The legislative history quoted in the opinion reads:
The committee bill would make more specific a provision now in the law that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid under the plan, States must use reasonable standards consistent with the objectives of the titles. Although States may set a limitation on income and resources which individuals may hold and be eligible for aid, they must do so by maintaining a comparability among the various categorical groups of needy people. Whatever level of financial eligibility the State determines to be that which is applicable for the eligibility of the needy aged, for example, shall be comparable to that which the State sets to determine the eligibility for the needy blind and disabled; and must also have a comparability to the standards used to determine the eligibility of those who are to receive medical assistance as needy children and the parents or other relatives caring for them. S. 984 (1977) ). In Friedman, the Second Circuit rejected a suit by institutionalized medically needy plaintiffs seeking to invalidate a New York regulation that restricted the amount of income they could retain to $28.50 per month. The court found that there was comparable treatment between the medically and categorically needy.
The Ninth Circuit, construing the same statute and regulation in Dawson, reached the opposite conclusion. It disposed of the comparability provision by dividing it into two parts:
The first part specifically excepts income and resources when it equates SSI eligibility to the medically needy eligibility requirements. And so, while this provision does extend all of the SSI eligibility requirements to the medically needy, it does not do so for those which deal with the applicant's income and resources. Were this not the case, then there would be no distinction between the two groups.
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The second part of the comparability provision, according to the court, "only requires the standards to be comparable, not identical. .. . The [standards other than the asset transfer rule] which are used for determining financial eligibility are similar enough to invite comparison." 75 In rejecting the applicants' argument that the California statute conflicts with the availability provision of the federal statute, the court refused to define "availability" literally by equating it with "present record title or ownership." 76 The court found support for this interpretation in an HHS regulation allowing states to consider income for a six-month prospective period when determining eligibility. 77 Because the regulation permits evaluation of future income, the court concluded that a state "should also be allowed to consider those assets which have been recently disposed of under circumstances which indicate that the purpose was to qualify for public medical assistance." 78
The state to use no more restrictive eligibility requirements for the medically needy than for the categorically needy. 80 In its discussion, the Dawson court first noted that to read the regulation the way the applicants did "would be [to read] an inconsistency into the federal statutory and regulatory framework. The Medicaid program is designed to provide benefits to two differently situated groups ....
By definition, different financial requirements apply to the medically needy than to the categorically needy." 81 The second and more persuasive point made by the court was that the subsection 401(c) regulation, upon which the applicants and other courts relied so heavily, is one of a group of HHS regulations establishing general eligibility requirements: 82 "There is absolutely no discussion of financial eligibility requirements in any of the other sections of this subpart. Instead, the focus of all of the sections is directed toward much more general concerns, such as eligibility requirements which are based on citizenship, alienage, or state residence." 83 Without discussing them, the court noted that three other subparts of the regulations describe the financial eligibility requirements. It declared that these specific regulations, which establish rules for evaluating the resources of a medically needy applicant,84 supersede the more general eligibility rules.8
The Dawson and CaIdwell courts both discussed a series of letters, written by HHS regional directors to state officials in New York and Michigan and to a legal services program in California, stating that asset transfer rules are invalid as applied to the medically needy. 8 8 The Caldwell court accorded some weight to these letters 87 and deferred to the HHS interpretation of the statute3 8 But the Dawson court, while recognizing the principle that a "court generally defers to an administrative agency's interpretation of the The Dawson court's reliance on HHS's general approval of an entire program in the face of the agency's very specific letters to the contrary is at best contrived. A better view is that such general approval of a state plan "is not more than slightly persuasive when, as here, the so-called approval does not appear to have followed explicit attention to the question now confronted." 91 The Dawson court wished to reject the HHS interpretation of the statute and did so. In view of the HHS letters, the Ninth Circuit's effort to find support for that rejection in HHS's casual approval of the entire California program is questionable. The leading cases invalidating state rules that restricted AFDC eligibility are King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (Alabama regulation denying AFDC payments to children of a woman who cohabited with an able-bodied man invalidated under supremacy clause because Congress intended "parent" to mean only those with a legal duty to support a child), Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (Illinois statute denying AFDC payments to eighteen to twenty year-old college students invalidated because the Social Security Act's definition of a dependent child included college students in that age group), and Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 602 (1972) (California regulation denying AFDC payments to needy families when a parent was absent for military service invalidated because the federal eligibility criterion requiring a parent to be absent from the home "accurately describe[d] a parent on active military duty").
Using these AFDC eligibility cases, the applicants in Dawson argued that "states are not permitted to deprive otherwise eligible individuals of benefits by the use of restrictive eligibility criteria which are not included in the federal legislation." Brief for Appellants at 22, Dawson v. Myers. In a conclusory footnote the court rejected this argument, stating that it was "unable to find any provision of the statute which said this." 622 F.2d at 1310 n.8.
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Equally unsatisfactory is the Caldwell court's discussion of the legislative history. In rejecting New York's argument that the sole purpose of the comparability provision was to assure comparable treatment among the various groups of medically needy people, 93 the court thought more highly of subsequent legislative interpretations than of contemporaneous legislative history. 4 Attempts to amend the Social Security Act to explicitly authorize state imposition of asset transfer rules, 95 with the attendant implication that the The Dawson court did not discuss any of the aforementioned AFDC cases. Instead, it relied on a later ease, New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) , to support its conclusion that, because of the cooperative federal-state nature of the Medicaid program, it would be inappropriate to invalidate an eligibility requirement that Congress had failed to prohibit in the Medicaid statute. 622 F.2d at 1310 n.8.
The Fabula court, on the other hand, cited Townsend to support its conclusion that Maryland could not use an eligibility requirement that was more restrictive than the federal requirements. The bill permits States to deny medical assistance to any aged, blind, or disabled person (including individuals who are not "categorically ineligible") who has given away assets in order to meet the medicaid eligibility requirements (or has "sold" such assets for less than their fair market value).
The bill would allow States the option of denying or limiting eligibility in this type of situation. If a State chooses to make use of this provision, an aged, blind, or disabled person would be considered (for purposes of medicaid eligibility) to still possess a disposed-of asset for a period of 12 months if he gave it away in order to become eligible for medicaid. S. RLs. No. 471, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1979 
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Act had not previously authorized such restrictions, tended to confirm to the court the HHS interpretation of the statute. 96 Using legislative history in this manner is dubious. Indeed, the same court in an earlier case declared that "pronouncements by a subsequent Congress are not entitled to the same weight as those of the Congress which enacted a measure." 97 The Supreme Court has expressed similar sentiments regarding subsequent legislative history. 98 
B. Fraud Prevention Versus Legitimate Need
Neither the Dawson decision, which would permit all restrictions on asset transfers, nor the Caldwell decision, which would prohibit all asset transfer rules, is satisfactory from a policy standpoint. Both fail to resolve the basic conflict highlighted by the cases themselves. The states have legitimate arguments for restricting the transfer of any resources by Medicaid applicants, even those resources excluded in eligibility determinations. 9 9 The state rules not only express concern that eligibility for benefits may be fraudulently obtained, but also reflect the states' desire to recover the cost of Medicaid benefits out of the recipient's estate after he or she dies. 100 These goals are not unreasonable. They should be met, however, so that those who truly need medical assistance are not denied benefits when there is clearly neither fraud nor an intent to cheat the state out of its recovery.
In some of the cases in which state transfer of assets rules have been challenged, variations in statutory and regulatory construction and in the degree of deference to state concerns intimate that considerations of equity may be guiding the courts. The cases recognize, some explicitly,' 0 ' that efforts to prevent fraud and abuse underlie the state statutes. The courts have attempted to harmonize that statutory intent with the needs of deserving applicants against whom asset transfer rules have been applied unfairly. For example, in Buckner v. Maker, 0 2 a class action in which a federal district court invalidated Connecticut's transfer of assets rule, the court repeatedly emphasized that the state made no allegadons of fraud against any of the applicants. 0 3 The state argued only that a transfer of resources within seven years of application for benefits, in violation of the state statute, justified denial of those benefits. 10 4 One of the applicants, an eighty-six year-old man, had sold his home for $34,000. During the next three years, that sum was "frittered away in numerous small transactions, under circumstances which suggest that he was the victim of individuals who took advantage of his gullibility and reduced mental capacity to divest him of his holdings." 105 If the court had upheld the Connecticut statute and regulations, he would have remained ineligible for Medicaid benefits for more than eight years. 1 6 A second applicant, an eighty year-old man, transferred his interest in his house to his daughter in exchange for $5,000 ten years after she had begun living with him, caring for him and the house, and paying taxes on the house. He was denied Medicaid benefits because of the state's determination-without accounting for the daughter's non-pecuniary contribution-that the true value of his interest in the house was $11,843. He also would have remained ineligible for benefits for several years. Id. 370 . Under the Connecticut scheme, benefits were denied for whatever period of time the value of the transferred asset would have paid the individual's expenses.
Although the court insisted that the basis for its decision was conflict with federal law and not the unreasonable nature of the Connecticut rule, the opinion suggests that the cruelty with which the rule operated against the applicants in this case strongly influenced the case's outcome:
This court finds that the Connecticut rule has the effect, if not the avowed intent, of presuming that transferred assets are still available to the transferor. In many cases, such as that of an elderly Medicaid applicant These case-by-case efforts to resolve the asset transfer issue in the courts have not provided satisfactory solutions. Rather, they suffering from senility who has been cajoled out of his assets or actually defrauded, the presumption can be a cruel and irrational one.
Id. 373.
In another case, Udina v. Walsh, a federal district court invalidated a Missouri transfer of assets rule on the ground that it conflicted with federal law. 440 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mo. 1977 . Several applicants were represented. One of them owned a savings certificate with a value of $9,639. Late in 1974, she redeemed it and gave all of the money to her father. Id. 1153 . In 1975 Medicaid and cash assistance benefits were terminated because she had transferred the certificate without consideration, despite her ability to prove at an agency hearing that the money had never been hers-her father had earned it, and it bad been kept in her name because of "family difficulties." Id. Blum, a state court upheld New York's asset transfer rule against attack by an eighty-seven year-old man who sold his home while he was in a nursing home, gave the $20,000 in proceeds to his sons, and one year later applied for Medicaid benefits. 66 A.D.2d 351, 412 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1979) . In upholding the state agency's denial of benefits, the court expressed its concern about fraud: "Since immediately prior to the time of transfer assets were available, the fact of transfer coupled with an intent later to file for benefits constitutes a species of misrepresentation or fraud undertaken for the applicant's benefit at the expense of the public fisc." Id. [Vol. 129:882 have left the law in a state of confusion,"' with receipt of benefits dependent on a court's willingness to enjoin enforcement of state statutes or regulations. Now that Congress has explicitly authorized states to impose asset transfer rules, 11 2 each state must outline precisely a plan that fairly balances the state's valid interests with those of needy individuals.
III. REINTERPRETING THE STATUTE AND REGULATIONS
Although state asset transfer rules are now authorized explicitly by federal legislation, 1 3 at least two reasons remain to seek a correct interpretation of the statute and regulations at issue in the asset transfer cases." 4 First, the new legislation became effective on March 1, 1981,1" 5 and cases brought before that date are still pending11 6 These cases will have to be decided by the courts based on the law as interpreted before the new legislation became effective. Second, the recent legislation retains the link between SSI and Medicaid eligibility," 7 but it does not resolve the issue of "comparability" between SSI and Medicaid beneficiaries. Litigation concerning this issue is likely to continue, therefore, until either Congress or the Supreme Court makes clear whether "comparable" as used in the statute should be interpreted to mean "identical" or merely "similar."
Whenever the language of a statute is ambiguous, it is appropriate to look to the congressional purposes in enacting the legis-"'Characteristics other than appealing fact patterns also distinguish these cases. The cases upholding asset transfer rules usually have not been class actions; generally they have been tried in state courts. See, e.g Nonetheless, because of both the fact patterns and the courts' own recognition of the fraud/no fraud distinction, that distinction is also a valid basis on which to distinguish these cases and must be taken into account when states draft legislation to deal with the transfer of assets problem. lation. 11s The general purpose of the Medicaid program is to assist the poor in meeting the costs of health care; 119 the specific purpose of the portion of the program devoted to the medically needy is to prevent the potential financial catastrophe created by high medical expenses.' 20 The original congressional intent in enacting Medicaid was to provide comprehensive coverage by 1975,121 in terms of both persons eligible and services provided. This intent was modified, however, by the 1972 amendments to the statute, which "reflect congressional concern for state fiscal interests." 122 The language of the Medicaid statute's comparability 123 and availability 12 4 provisions, at issue in the asset transfer cases, also has been changed '2 somewhat since the Medicaid program was established in 1965. There is nothing in the legislative history, however, to suggest that the intent underlying either provision has changed. 26 The legislative history of the comparability provision indicates that it was intended to assure comparability between the 118 United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953 The Secretary shall not make payments under the preceding provisions of this section to any State unless the State makes a satisfactory showing that it is making efforts in the direction of broadening the scope of the care and services made available under the plan and in the direction of liberalizing the eligibility requirements for medical assistance, with a view toward furnishing by July 1, 1975, comprehensive care and services to substantially all individuals who meet the plan's eligibility standards with respect to income and resources, including services to enable such individuals to attain or retain independence or self-care. Social Security Amendments of 1965 , Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1903 [Vol. 129:882 various groups of medically needy individuals covered by the statute. 2 7 The history of the availability provision shows that it was intended to prevent relatives (other than spouses, or parents of minor or disabled children) from being required to contribute to the medical expenses of a family member. As the Senate report accompanying the original act states:
These provisions are designed so that the States will not assume the availability of income which may not, in fact, be available or overevaluate income and resources which are available. Examples of income assumed include support orders from absent fathers, which have not been paid or contributions from relatives which are not in reality received by the needy individual.
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Because the Dawson v. Myers' 2 9 court was correct in its observation that the HHS subsection 401(c) regulation, so hotly contested in these cases, 30 pertains to general eligibility requirements and not directly to financial eligibility requirements, 131 it becomes important to examine the regulation dealing directly with medically needy financial eligibility. 32 That regulation establishes that a state agency determining Medicaid eligibility must, "[flor aged, blind, or disabled individuals in States covering all SSI recipients, deduct the value of resources that would be deducted in determining eligibility under SSI." 133
The resources to be deducted in determining SSI eligibility may be found in another set of HHS regulations.'3 Excludable resources include an applicant's home, household goods, automobile, property essential to self support, and life insurance up to a face value of $1,500.13 5 138 Owners of excess resources who did not dispose of them prior to application could still receive benefits. The recipient had to agree in writing to dispose of the excess assets, however, and the payments received during the period of disposal were considered "overpayments." 20 C.F. R. § 416.1240 (1980) . In addition, if an SSI recipient sold an asset that was deducted in determining eligibility, the proceeds of the sale could be included in his resources. Soc.AL SEculur CLAIMs MAN Ar, supra note 28, at § 12508(a)(2). Medically indigent elderly individuals, if defined to include all those who may freely transfer their assets in order to obtain government subsidization of long-term care, are a potentially huge number of people. 145 Congress recently accommodated the states' concern with preventing abuse of the Medicaid program by authorizing delays in Medicaid eligibility for applicants who transfer assets. 40 Congress failed, however, to outline rules that would also provide necessary medical care to the needy.
The Social Security Amendments of 1980, which became effective on March 1, 1981,1 47 provide that any asset given away or sold for less than fair market value within twenty-four months prior to application for benefits will be included in the applicant's resources if the asset was disposed of for the purpose of establishing eligibility for SSI.1 48 The amount included will be the asset's fair market value at the time it was transferred, less any compensation received. "Convincing" evidence that the transfer was made "exclusively" for some other purpose is required to rebut a statutory presumption that the transfer was made to establish eligibility for SSI benefits. 149 States now are also expressly authorized to deny Medicaid to an applicant who "would not be eligible for such medical assistance but for the fact that he disposed of resources for less than fair market value." 1o State procedures for determining Medicaid eligibility still may be no more restrictive than the federally mandated SSI procedure, with one exception: if the uncompensated value Ir" of the asset transferred by an applicant is greater than $12,000, states may delay eligibility for longer than twenty-four months. In such cases, the period of ineligibility must "bear a reasonable relationship" to the uncompensated value of the asset transferred.
-5 2 construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong... 147 The law provided that the SSI amendment was to become effective with respect to applications filed "on or after the first day of the first month which begins at least 60 days after the date of enactnent of this Act." Id. §5(c).
148 Id. § 5(a). Finally, if an applicant is ineligible for Medicaid solely because of the SSI rule, 153 but would be eligible under the state's asset transfer rule, the state may apply its own rule in lieu of the SSI rule. 15 4 Unfortunately, Congress did not establish more specific guidelines for states to follow in creating their asset transfer rules. The asset transfer cases illustrate the deficiencies of already existing state rules; 155 Congress should have scrutinized these cases more carefully and dealt with at least the most glaring problems. Thoughtful construction of asset transfer rules at the state level, however, can cure some of the congressional omissions. 156 The new legislation does not establish a minimum dollar value for the asset transfers that will preclude eligibility for Medicaid benefits. Such a provision would have prevented states from penalizing individuals who transfer minimal resources. 15 7 More importantly, however, the legislation fails to address the problem of an interminable eligibility delay. 158 For asset transfers whose uncompensated value exceeds $12,000, the legislation places no limit on the period of time during which states may delay eligibility. It merely demands that a period of ineligibility exceeding twentyfour months "bear a reasonable relationship" to the uncompensated value of the asset transferred. 1 5 9 This loose standard creates a risk that the length of eligibility delay will be measured against a state's limited reimbursement rates rather than against the applicant's medical care needs, 6 0 leading to inhumane delays. The provision reflects a lack of consideration of the actual costs of long-term care, which may run as high as $20,000 per year. 161 An individual who transfers assets with an uncompensated value of $14,000 and consumes care costing $20,000 per year thus could be denied benefits for a period of time much longer than that for which his or her transferred assets would have paid. Such a practice would be both illogical and punitive.
Because the legislation gives states some flexibility to fashion asset transfer policies, 62 states can cure this defect by making the length of eligibility delay proportionate to the dollar value of the assets transferred and the actual costs of the care provided. Under such a rule, a person who transfers assets with an uncompensated value of $14,000 and consumes health care costing $20,000 per year would be denied benefits for only about eight and one-half months, by which time his assets would have been exhausted anyway. 63 Another flaw in the legislation is the vague standard of "convincing evidence" that must 64 be met to rebut the presumption that the transfer was made to establish eligibility for Medicaid benefits. Whether this standard requires the use of only "objective" factors, such as those required by the California regulations, 16 5 or whether it permits subjective factors, such as intent or lack of knowlstate formula rather than according to the applicant's needs). Cf. 22 CAL. AD. CoDE § 50411, quoted in Brief for Appellees at 14 n.5, Dawson v. Myers, 622 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Beltran v. Myers, 101 S. Ct. 353 (1980) ("'period of ineligibility may be further reduced by deducting the actual cost to the applicant or beneficiary for medical expenses incurred!").
11 Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 25, Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S. June 24, 1980) (No. 79-2034) .
162 ,"In the case of medicaid eligibility, the amendment makes explicit the intent . . . to grant the States more flexibility. The amendment would permit States to establish disposal of asset disqualification rules for medicaid purposes which differ in detail from the SSI rule." 126 CoNG. REc. S16,505-06 (daily ed.
Dec. 13, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Long).
183This proposal establishes a more realistic link between the value of the assets transferred and the cost of care consumed. It permits regional variations in the length of eligibility delay. In states where long-term care is relatively less expensive, therefore, the delay could be longer.
164 SSI applicants also must rebut a statutory presumption of forbidden purpose by proving that the transfer was "exclusively" for some other purpose. Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(a), 94 Stat. 3567 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1382b). The law provides that state procedures for determining Medicaid eligibility may be no more restrictive than the SSI procedure (with one exception, see text accompanying notes 151-52 supra). Id. § 5(b). Presumably, states are free to use a less stringent evidentiary standard, but it is difficult to identify a less stringent standard because the SSI standard is so poorly defined.
16 5 See note 48 supra.
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edge, to be introduced in rebuttal is unclear. If the concern of the states is to prevent fraud and abuse, subjective factors should be considered relevant. Subjective factors are particularly important for individuals who are incapable of making rational decisions concerning the disposition of their property, or who are powerless to stop the disposition of property in which they have an interest.' 66 Creating an automatic exemption from the presumption of forbidden purpose when an applicant transfers assets excluded from the eligibility determination could also cure the statute's vague evidentiary standard. 1 7 The states probably will be reluctant to choose this method, however, because one goal of state asset transfer rules is to keep even excludable resources in the Medicaid recipient's possession so that the state may recover the cost of benefits out of those resources after the recipient dies. 168 To discourage asset transfers by Medicaid recipients and to provide a source from which to recover expenditures, therefore, states may wish to make it difficult for an applicant to rebut the presumption of forbidden purpose, even when otherwise excludable resources are transferred. If Congress wished to recognize this state interest in recovering expenditures, it should have done so explicitly. Both the states and their Medicaid applicants then would have notice that such restrictions on asset transfers are consistent with federal law.
Similarly, Congress should have made clear whether a state's presumption of forbidden purpose conflicts with federal law. A reasonable interpretation of the new SSI rule concerning asset transfers 169 is that a transfer of excludable resources 1 70 cannot give rise to the presumption of purpose to qualify for benefits because, by definition, excludable resources do not affect eligibility. If HHS chooses this interpretation to implement the statute, but states choose to presume that any transfer of assets is made in order to establish eligibility, then more litigation over the still unresolved issue of "comparability" between SSI and Medicaid beneficiaries 171 is likely to arise. Hence, this deficiency in the legislation may result in delay or denial of benefits to elderly medically indigent individuals having neither the time nor the money for protracted litigation. Other legislation introduced to, but not enacted by, the 96th Congress would have authorized states to recover the cost of benefits from a transferee up to the uncompensated value of the property he or she has received. 172 The legislative history accompanying that provision, explicitly recognizing the possibility that elderly individuals may be victimized by those to whom they transfer resources, 173 declared that states should not "penalize individuals that have been subject to such exploitation by delaying their eligibility for medicaid." 174 States should remember this possibility of exploitation when they write their transfer of assets rules. They also should keep in mind individuals, such as Mr. Manahan,1 75 who lack any real control over the distribution of assets in which they may have a legal interest. State rules should give limited discretion to appropriate social services officials to reduce -or waive eligibility delay' 76 when a delay would unreasonably or unfairly deny needed Medicaid benefits.
Finally, states will have to supply certain procedural details omitted from the federal statute in order to have a workable plan.'"7 A forum must be established to hear evidence concerning the purpose of the applicant's transfer of assets. There must also be a '7 2 H.R. 7765, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. §333(a)(2) (1980). The legislative history accompanying the provision indicates an intent that states would use "appropriate State judicial procedures to assure due process to a transferee." H.R. REP. No. 1167 , 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1980 . No actions for recovery could have been initiated later than three years after the end of the transferor's ineligibility period. The amount of recovery would have been limited by the "lesser of the uncompensated value [of the transferred asset] or the cost of the medical assistance provided to the transferor during or after the period the transferor was (or could have been) determined to be ineligible." Id.
Such safeguards may not eliminate all potential constitutional objections by transferees if states do attempt to recover from them. However, such a recovery could be considered analogous to the federal estate tax imposed on gifts made in contemplation of death. See I.R.C. § 2035.
173 H.R. rP. No. 1167 , 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1980 . This sort of victimization of the elderly has been recognized by the courts as well. In Moran v. Lascaris, the court discussed the sale of an elderly woman's home by her son while she was in a nursing home. 61 A.D.2d 405, 402 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1978) . There was no evidence that she was aware of her son's action, but the sale resulted in the termination of the woman's Medicaid benefits by the state agency. The court reversed the termination.
174 H.R. REP. No. 1167 , 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1980 . 176 See text accompanying notes 2-4 &upra. 176See H.R. 7765, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. §333(a)(2) (1980), which would have permitted states to reduce or waive a period of ineligibility if such action was "justified:' '77 State procedures for determining Medicaid eligibility can be no more restrictive than SSI procedures. Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(b) , 94 Stat. 3567 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a). State procedures, therefore, will have to comply with whatever regulations H1-IS promulgates to implement the statute.
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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW mechanism for administrative appeal and/or judicial review in the event an application is denied. Whatever procedures are established must be efficient and expeditious. Time is of the essence because the elderly applicant often will have little time to wait.
CONCLUSION
Many elderly people require long-term institutional care today and will continue to require such care in the future. This care often replaces home living and becomes a permanent arrangement. Forbidding all asset transfer rules could gradually convert the Medicaid program, designed to provide health care to the poor, into a long-term care subsidy for persons with moderate or substantial assets. Such a result could encourage states to terminate assistance to the medically needy altogether.
This Comment has analyzed recent cases dealing with transfer of assets rules, proposing an alternative resolution that strikes a fairer balance between the interests of the states and the needs of individuals. It also has examined and criticized recent legislation that permits states to impose asset transfer rules, suggesting elements that states should incorporate in their rules to assure that Medicaid abuse may be prevented, without destroying the original congressional objective of providing medical assistance to the needy.
[NOTE: After this Comment had gone to press, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Beltran v. Myers, 49 U.S.L.W. 4534 (U.S. May 18, 1981). The Court vacated the decision of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the legislation discussed in this Comment.) [Vol. 129:882 
